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INTRODUCTION
Single-room occupancy (SRO) housing once dominated the
New York City housing market. As recently as the mid-twentieth
century, there were hundreds of thousands of SROs spread
throughout the City. Today, following a half-century of concerted
attacks by City government, SROs constitute a fraction of a single
percent of New York’s rental housing stock.1
† Senior Staff Attorney, MFY Legal Services, Inc., SRO Law Project. J.D., Ge-
orgetown University Law Center. Thank you to Jon Burke, my co-author; to my col-
leagues at MFY Legal Services, in particular Chris Schwartz, Elise Brown, and Jeanette
Zelhof for their editorial input; and to my wife Erica Chutuape.
†† Staff Attorney, Community Legal Aid. J.D., New York University School of Law.
Thanks to Brian Sullivan, my co-author; Christopher Schwartz, Supervising Attorney
at the SRO Law Project; and Lindsay Manning, my wife.
1 In the mid-twentieth century there were approximately 200,000 SRO units in
New York City. See Malcolm Gladwell, N.Y. Hopes to Help Homeless by Reviving Single
Room Occupancy Hotels, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-
04-25/news/mn-27098_1_single-room-occupancy-hotels. By 1993 there were approxi-
mately 46,744 SRO units. ANTHONY J. BLACKBURN, SINGLE ROOM LIVING IN NEW YORK
CITY 15 (1996). By 2002 this number had dropped to 35,227. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
SER. IA, TBL. 15, NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY (2002),  http://www.
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The City’s decimation of SRO housing has amplified the ongo-
ing housing crisis, constricting the low-income housing market and
contributing to the ballooning homelessness problem. The overall
effect on poor and working-class residents has been tragic.
The current dearth of SRO units is not the inevitable result of
impersonal or unalterable market forces. City policy, acting dynam-
ically with market forces, is responsible for the crisis, and a change
in policy can undo the damage. If City and State are serious about
confronting New York City’s housing crisis, existing SRO policies
need to be changed and their legacy confronted. City and State
must take steps to permit and encourage the expansion of the SRO
housing stock. This effort will require stemming the conversion of
existing SROs to other (higher profit) uses and creating legal ave-
nues for the construction or reconversion of additional units.
This Article will analyze the role of SROs in the City’s housing
market. We will discuss the importance of SRO housing and the
history of SRO policy. We will briefly describe the nature of the
City’s housing crisis and the role SROs play in that crisis. Finally,
we will make several suggestions as to how SRO policies should be
changed to alleviate the impact of the housing crisis on low-income
City residents.
census.gov/housing/nychvs/data/2002/s1at15.html. See also Corey Kilgannon, Be It
Ever So Humble. O.K., It’s Shabby, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2005), http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/08/25/nyregion/25hotel.html. The best available census data suggests
that between 2000 and 2010 the number of SROs ranged between approximately
25,000 and 35,000 units. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SER. IA, TBL. 15, 2005 NEW YORK
CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY (2005), http://www.census.gov/housing/nychvs/
data/2005/s1at15.html; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SER. IA, TBL. 15, 2008 NEW YORK CITY
HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY (2008), http://www.census.gov/housing/nychvs/
data/2008/ser1a.html (follow link at “New York City Structure Class”); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, SER. IA, TBL. 15, 2011 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY (2011),
http://www.census.gov/housing/nychvs/data/2011/ser1a.html (follow link at “New
York City Structure Class”). Current estimates used by advocates and government
agencies range from approximately 15,000 to 35,000 units. See, e.g., GODDARD RIVER-
SIDE WEST SIDE SRO PROJECT, Testimony by Tenant Organizer Yarrow Willman-Cole
and Former Supervisor of Organizing Terry Poe (May 2, 2008) (on file with co-au-
thors). The variance is at least in part attributable to the fact that estimates of the
number of SROs frequently measure different things, such as the number of occupied
or habitable units versus the number of units registered with the State pursuant to the
rent regulation laws. Overall, there are more than 2.1 million rental units (not owner
occupied) in New York City. FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POL’Y, RENT
STABILIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (2012) [hereinafter N.Y.C. RENT STABILIZATION],
available at http://furmancenter.org/files/HVS_Rent_Stabilization_fact_sheet_FI
NAL_4.pdf.
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I. THE BASICS OF SRO HOUSING
“I have principally, over my lunch break, gone to the books in order to learn
how you become a tenant in a stabilized hotel [SRO]. And the law in the hotel
context is very, very different from the law in the apartment context.”2
SROs are perhaps the most basic form of housing available in
New York City.3 Generally, an SRO is a “unit with one or two rooms
. . . lacking complete bathroom and/or kitchen facilities for the
exclusive use of the tenant.”4 Most SRO tenants live in single rooms
and share bathroom facilities located in the common areas of the
building; lack of access to kitchen facilities of any sort is common.
Beyond these basic similarities, SROs vary significantly.5 They
exist in hotels, rooming houses, apartment buildings, lodging
houses, and so forth.6 Some SROs, such as Bowery flophouses, are
simply beds in a cubicle with a wire mesh ceiling, while others
more closely resemble traditional hotel rooms with linen and other
services (though this form of SRO is very rare). Some appear as
small studios without private bathrooms. City and State laws do a
poor job of coherently dealing with this heterogeneity.7
SRO units are subject to rent stabilization if they meet certain
2 1234 Broadway v. Kruttack, No. L&T 94541/06, slip. op. at 3 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Hous.
Part Jan. 25, 2008) (Schneider, J.).
3 Even the most rudimentary SRO room—four plywood walls and a chicken wire
ceiling—constitute dwelling units that must be maintained by property owners in a
habitable condition. See N.Y.C. ADMIN CODE §§ 27-2004(3), 27-2005 (2013).
4 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 13.
5 The New York Times has disparagingly characterized SRO heterogeneity as
follows: “They range from the squalid, degrading and dangerous at the bottom to the
spare, poor but reasonably clean and safe at the top.” Richard Bernstein, At S.R.O.’s,
Quality Varies Yet Squalor Is Common, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1994), http://www.nytimes.
com/1994/06/12/nyregion/at-sro-s-quality-varies-yet-squalor-is-common.html.
6 SROs may exist in both Class A (permanent occupancy) and Class B (temporary
occupancy) multiple dwellings. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(7)–(9) (McKinney
2013).
7 There is no common definition of SRO in the basic housing laws. In the
Multiple Dwelling Law (MDL) and Housing Maintenance Code (HMC), “Single
Room Occupancy” is a form of occupancy, not a type of unit:
[T]he occupancy by one or two persons of a single room, or of two or
more rooms which are joined together, separated from all other rooms
within an apartment in a multiple dwelling, so that the occupant or
occupants thereof reside separately and independently of the other
occupant or occupants of the same apartment.
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(16). See also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2004(17) (2013).
Subject to several exceptions, the HMC and MDL use rooming unit in place of SRO.
The Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) uses an entirely different set of terms, which are
inconsistent with the MDL and HMC, to refer to SROs. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 9, § 2521.3(c) (2013) (suggesting that “single room occupancy facilities”
may be defined as “hotels”).
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criteria.8 SRO units located within hotels9 are regulated if the rent
was less than $350 per month, or $88 per week, on May 31, 1968; if
the hotel was built before July 1, 1969; and if the hotel contains six
or more units.10 All other SRO units are subject to regulation if
located in a building containing six or more units that was
constructed prior to January 1, 1974.11 The New York State Division
of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) together with New
York State Courts, have the authority to determine, upon
application, whether an SRO unit is subject to rent stabilization.12
In recognition of the unique nature of SRO housing, the rules
governing SRO tenancies are “very different” from those governing
8 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-506(a) (McKinney 2013); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11. The rent regulatory status of SROs was, for some time,
contested. The issue was not settled with any degree of certainty until the late 1990s.
City and State enacted various rent regulation laws between 1946 and 1974. In 1981,
the Court of Appeals held that (most) SROs were not covered by these laws and thus
they were not regulated. La Guardia v. Cavanaugh, 53 N.Y.2d 67, 76–80 (1981)
(applying holding to Class B multiple dwellings). The New York State legislature
almost immediately passed a law intended to reverse the decision. See Tegreh Realty
Corp. v. Joyce, 451 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (1st Dep’t 1982). Then, in 1997, the Court of
Appeals ruled that even the most basic SROs were regulated. See Gracecor Realty Co.
v. Hargrove, 90 N.Y.2d 350, 354 (1997) (holding that a “partitioned space” in a
lodging house was subject to rent stabilization).
9 Hotel is not defined in the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) except in the following
passing statement:
[A]ny Class A multiple dwelling . . . commonly regarded as a hotel,
transient hotel or residential hotel, and which customarily provides
hotel service such as maid service, furnishings and laundering of linen,
telephone and bell boy service, secretarial or desk service and use and
upkeep of furniture and fixtures[.]
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-504(a)(1)(e). Note that all Class B units are exempt from
this definition. The RSC expands hotel to include “[a]ny class A or Class B [unit]
which provides all of the services included in the rent as set forth in section 2521.3 of
this Title.” See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.6(b). The services enumer-
ated in section 2521.3 are “maid service . . . linen service, furniture and furnishings
. . . and [a] lobby staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 9, § 2521.3(a). Subsection (c) further complicates matters by providing that
SRO facilities “such as single-room occupancy hotels or rooming houses . . . shall be
included in the definition of hotel as set forth in section 2520.6(b) . . . except that the
four minimum services enumerated in such section shall not be required to be pro-
vided . . . .” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2521.3(c).
10 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-506(a); N.Y. RENT STAB. § 2520.11(g) (McKinney
2013).
11 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8625(a)(4)–(a)(5) (McKinney 2013); see also N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-504(b).
12 See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-506(b); see generally Gracecor, 90 N.Y.2d 350. See also
Marti Weithman & Gerald Lebovits, Single Room Occupancy Law in New York City, 36
N.Y. REAL PROP. L.J. 21 (2008) (discussing SRO law).
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apartments.13 An individual residing in an SRO may become a
stabilized tenant—referred to as a permanent tenant—by requesting
a six month lease or continuously residing in the building as her
permanent residence for six months.14 All SRO residents who are
not permanent tenants are classified as “hotel occupant[s]” and
have a protected right to become a permanent tenant.15 The New
York City Housing Court has gone so far as to hold that an
individual need not be a legal occupant of an SRO unit in order to
become a permanent tenant.16
II. THE NEED FOR SRO HOUSING
“Inside New York City’s remaining . . . units of single-room-occupancy
housing—often criticized for their squalor—are some of the city’s most
vulnerable people. The poor and the elderly mix with the crippled and the
alcoholic, the drug-addicted and the mentally ill, each holding on to a
fragile independence. . . . Until a decade ago the hotels were hardly considered
a valuable resource. . . . But their vital role as shelters for the poor [has
become] evident[.]”17
SROs are housing of last resort—the safety net at the bottom
of the market providing shelter for the poor and near-poor. Rents
for SRO units are lower than those for any other form of
unsubsidized housing. The median rent for an SRO unit is
between $450 and $705 per month.18 By comparison, the median
13 1234 Broadway v. Kruttack, No. L&T 94541/06, slip. op. at 3 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Hous.
Part Jan. 25, 2008) (Schneider, J.).
14 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.6(j), (m); see also id. § 2522.5(a)(2)
(stipulating that a hotel occupant renting a room who has never had a lease may
request a lease and then become a permanent tenant for a term of at least six months,
but the lease need not be renewed).
15 Id. § 2520.6(m).
16 See Kruttack, slip. op. at 6; but see 1234 Broadway LLC v. Pou Long Chen, 938
N.Y.S.2d 228 (Table), 2011 WL 4026908 (App. Term 1st Dep’t Sept. 9, 2011) (holding
that someone who came into possession of an SRO unit through an illicit
arrangement with a long-absent prime tenant and who had in no way communicated
with, made herself known to, or received permission from the landlord was not
entitled to possession of the SRO unit).
17 Suzanne Daley, Court Ruling Brings Fear to S.R.O. Hotel Rooms, N.Y. TIMES (July 10,
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/10/nyregion/court-ruling-brings-fear-to-
sro-hotel-rooms.html.
18 See Memorandum from N.Y.C. Rent Guidelines Board for All Board Members 4
(June 12, 2012) (on file with co-authors). These figures are based on testimony
offered to the Rent Guidelines Board by Goddard-Riverside’s West-Side SRO Law
Project in 2008 and data they derived from the 2002 Housing and Vacancy Survey. We
cite a range rather than a single figure here for two reasons. First, there is a high
degree of variance in SRO units and an accordingly high variance in rent charged.
Second, unlike other units, SROs are rarely singled out or disaggregated from census
rent data, and therefore precise information on rental rates is more difficult to find.
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rent for a rent-controlled unit is $895 per month; for a rent-
stabilized unit is $1,160; and for an unregulated unit is $1,510.19
SROs are frequently the only form of housing affordable to
poor households. Rent is affordable for a poor New York City
household at the (maximum) rate of $600.60 per month.20 The
median rent-controlled unit (the next cheapest form of housing
after SROs) is therefore almost $300 per month too expensive for a
poor household.21 For New Yorkers who live on Social Security or
public assistance, there are few affordable rental units in the City.
As of January 2014, the SSI benefit rate for a one-person household
is $808 per month.22 New York City’s Human Resources
Administration (HRA or Public Assistance) pays a shelter
allowance of $215 per month for a single individual.23
There is an uncontested relationship between the availability
of SRO housing and homelessness.24 The loss of SRO units over
recent decades has opened a gaping hole at the affordable end of
the housing market, with predictable effects: the loss of low-rent
SRO units simultaneously pushed poorer households into the
streets and (temporarily) into higher-rent units, which put
pressure on the middle of the market. Now, the City is suffering
In the past, the Rent Guidelines Board has refused to base estimates of SRO rents on
registered rents on the ground they are unreliable. N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD.,
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT—HOTEL ORDER #37, at 8 n.4 (June 27, 2007), available at
http://www.nycrgb.org/downloads/guidelines/orders/hotelES37.pdf.
19 MOON WHA LEE, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS
OF THE 2011 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 6 (2012), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/HPD-2011-HVS-Selected-Findings-
Tables.pdf. We use gross rather than contract rent as the vast majority of SRO rents
includes utilities.
20 See id. at 4. The annual median income for all households in 2010 was $48,040.
A poor or low-income household is one with annual income of 50% or less of Area
Median Income (AMI). Fifty percent of AMI is $24,020 annually, or approximately
$2,002 per month. Thirty percent of $2,002 is $600.60. This calculation uses the AMI
reported in the 2011 Housing and Vacancy Survey. Except where otherwise noted,
when AMI is used in this paper it will refer to the 2011 Housing and Vacancy Survey.
Regarding the rate at which rent is affordable, see infra, note 104.
21 See LEE, supra note 19, at 5–6.
22 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) IN NEW YORK 2 (2014),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-11146.pdf.
23 CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, PUBLIC BENEFITS FOR LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES:
APPLYING FOR AND USING PUBLIC BENEFIT PROGRAMS: CASH ASSISTANCE 3 (2013),
available at http://benefitsplus.cssny.org/system/files/benefit-tools/attachments/
Cash%20Assistance.pdf.
24 In 1980, a survey of the City shelter population indicated that approximately
50% of homeless men had previously resided in an SRO. See Gladwell, supra note 1.
See also Daley, supra note 17 (recounting that large numbers of the City’s homeless
once lived in rooming houses); BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 8.
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through “all-time record high”25 levels of homelessness.26 More
than 50,000 New Yorkers sleep in homeless shelters each night.27
Contrary to former Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s diagnosis, this
crisis is not due to “pleasurable” conditions in City shelters.28
Rather, it is, in part, a result of the City’s short-sighted SRO and
affordable housing policies.
III. THE DESTRUCTION OF SRO HOUSING
“What happened in New York was a great irony. We had literally hundreds of
thousands of SRO units that provided housing to large segments of the
population. Then the city decided that it was inadequate and unsuitable
and developed zoning provisions and incentives to put them out of business.
The result is the enormous homeless mess we have now.”29
SRO housing is as old as New York City itself. For a significant
period of the City’s history, a majority of the housing stock
consisted of shared-living units that would today be considered
SROs.30 Until the twentieth century, SROs housed a broad,
25 According to Coalition for the Homeless, in 2012 “New York City’s homeless
shelter population soared to its highest levels ever, with more than 43,000 homeless
New Yorkers—including a record 17,000 children—bedding down each night in
municipal shelters.” PATRICK MARKEE, COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, STATE OF
HOMELESSNESS 2012, at 2 (2012), http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/pages/
state-of-the-homeless-2012.
26 Gladwell, supra note 1 (quoting a housing advocate attributing the
“homelessness mess” to the loss of SRO units).
27 COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, NEW YORK CITY HOMELESSNESS: THE BASIC FACTS 1
(last updated March 2014), available at http://coalhome.3cdn.net/82168330ff3993
c0c8_2nm6bn760.pdf. This figure marks the high point thus far in a disturbing
upward climb in the homeless population over the past two decades. See also N.Y.C.
RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2012 INCOME & AFFORDABILITY STUDY 13 (2012), available at
http://www.nycrgb.org/downloads/research/pdf_reports/ia12.pdf (indicating that
each night, an average of 37,765 persons stayed in City shelters during 2011, up 1,589
persons from a year earlier, and up considerably from the average of 20,000 to 25,000
found in the 1990s).
28 Edgar Sandoval & Erin Durkin, Rats Are Coming Through the Walls and Worms
Infest the Bathrooms at City’s Homeless Shelters. But Mayor Bloomberg Says They’re So
Pleasurable that No One Wants to Leave, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.
nydailynews.com/new-york/rats-coming-walls-worms-infest-bathrooms-city-homeless-
shelters-mayor-bloomberg-pleasurable-leave-article-1.1143270.
29 Direct quote of Dan Margolis, director of the Community Housing
Improvement Program, as reported by Gladwell, supra note 1.
30 In an interview with The New York Times, Dr. Anthony Blackburn, see supra note 1,
said:
If you go back 150 years, most housing involved some form of shared
living. . . .
. . . .
There were tenements where people shared water taps and water closets
. . . boarding houses, where residents received dining-room service;
rooming houses, which were typically converted brownstones with one
120 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:113
socioeconomically diverse population.31 From the early 1900s SROs
increasingly became housing for single, working-class, and poor
men (and, to a lesser extent, women).32
Inchoate hostility toward “congregate living” has been a
feature of City politics since at least the mid-nineteenth century.33
However, City housing policy only turned comprehensively against
SROs in the mid-1950s. Beginning around 1955, and continuing
for nearly three decades thereafter, the City attempted to eliminate
SRO housing.34
The City’s anti-SRO policy was born out of the explosive
growth of low-rent SRO units during the Great Depression and the
WWII era. In the 1920s, landlords began (largely illegally) dividing
larger units into small SROs to rent to the unemployed and newly
poor. Through the 1930s and 1940s, landlords continued to
convert units to accommodate workers seeking jobs in the City’s
wartime munitions factories, and then returning soldiers, migrants
from the South, and immigrants (largely from Puerto Rico).35
The appearance of the new SROs had two important effects.
First, the new units greatly increased the visibility of SRO housing.
By mid-century, the total number of SRO rooms had risen above
200,000—more than 10% of the City’s rental stock.36 Second, when
added to the existing stock of low-rent units in rooming and
lodging houses, the new SROs intensified connections between
bath per floor and no cooking facilities. . . . Basically, all these forms
would, by today’s definition, be called SROs.
Dennis Hevesi, Building Homes for the Single Homeless, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 1999), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/1999/04/25/realestate/building-homes-for-the-single-homeless.
html.
31 As late as 1926, The New York Times could editorialize that “the perfect
apartment, at least in New York, is probably in a residential hotel.” PAUL GROTH,
LIVING DOWNTOWN: THE HISTORY OF RESIDENTIAL HOTELS IN THE UNITED STATES 3
(1999); see id. 20–24.
32 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 6–7; see also GROTH, supra note 31, at 104–05.
33 See GROTH, supra note 31, at 221, 238 (citing examples of hostility to SROs in
New York City, particularly among police and judges, dating back to the nineteenth
century); see id. at 13 (“Although the term ‘SRO’ is relatively new, for at least one
hundred years . . . commentators have railed against the real and implied dangers of
single room housing.”).
34 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 7; see generally Hevesi, supra note 30.
35 See Hevesi, supra note 30; see also BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 6.
36 See, e.g., Gladwell, supra note 1 (reporting that “[b]y the post-war 1940s, there
were almost 200,000 [SROs]”); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1950 CENSUS OF HOUSING,
VOL. II: NON-FARM HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, PT. 4, SEC. 3, TBL.G-2, CONTRACT
MONTHLY RENT OF RENTER-OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITS, FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK
(indicating that there were approximately 1,885,000 renter-ocupied units in New York
City).
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“SRO housing,” “bad housing,” and the poor.37
SRO growth thus worked to focus the hostility of “good
government types” discomfited by the living conditions of the
poor—and the poor themselves.38  New York’s anti-SRO activists
and officials were the heirs of its Progressive Era reformers.39 While
animated by a desire to do good, their actions reflected the
Progressive conception of the “housing problem,”40 informed by
class biases, social prejudices, and varying degrees of xenophobia
and racism.41 The tipping point for these reformers was crossed
when poor families—particularly, and not inconsequentially,
immigrant families—began moving into the new SROs in large
numbers.42 By the early 1950s, families with children had replaced
37 See Gladwell, supra note 1 (reporting that in the post-WWII era SROs were
known as “short term housing for the working poor” and “soon acquired an unsavory
reputation”).
38 This characterization is Blackburn’s. See generally BLACKBURN, supra note 1.
39 GROTH, supra note 31, at 203–33, 238–46 (describing nineteenth and twentieth
century origins and details of housing reform movement, and noting central role of
reformers and activists based in New York).
40 Id. at 241.
41 Id. Groth recounts the influence of the Progressive Era view that “the solution of
the housing problem . . . is to be found chiefly in legislation preventing the erection
of objectionable buildings and securing the adequate maintenance of all buildings.”
He also traces the heritage of the anti-SRO movement:
[Early SRO critics] were generally self-appointed and wealthy
businessmen—or their wives or minions—who volunteered their time
and considerable talents for public good. . . . Given their personal class
origins, most progressive reformers did not see low wages, uneven work
availability, or industrial leadership as being primarily culpable for the
urban chaos. . . . Like other Progressive Era figures, urban activists
initially attacked the problems of downtown [or SRO] living as moral
and cultural failures. They saw new ethnic, religious, and political
subcultures as threatening to hard-won changes in polite family life. . . .
The reformers were convinced that stronger, centrally ordained, and
better-enforced building rules would bring uplift to the lower class and
civic betterment to the city as a whole. . . . Better housing meant not
only better environmental health but also better social control.
Promotion of material progress became a prime tool of social
engineering. . . . Even when they were not acting en masse in some
political agitation, hotel people seemed to be forming subcultures that
deepened the social schisms of the time and weakened the cultural
hegemony of the middle and upper class. Reformers saw these dangers
as an assault on the urban polity as a whole . . . . Stated most simply, to
its critics the continued existence of hotel life worked against the
progress of the grand new city. In the biological analogies of the day,
the residential hotel buildings themselves served as incubators of old-
city pathologies. For the reformers working on the new city, single-room
dwellings were not a housing resource but a public nuisance.
Id. at 202–31.
42 Gladwell, supra note 1 (“In a few celebrated cases, chaotic conditions resulted
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single adults as the predominant occupants of the new SROs.43
The City quickly moved to put SROs “out of business.”44
Beginning in 1955, and continuing through the 1970s, the City
enacted a series of measures that drastically shrank the SRO
housing stock and irreversibly altered patterns of SRO occupancy.
The City banned the construction of new SRO units,45 restricted
SRO occupancy to exclude families,46 mandated the reconversion
of many of the new SRO units,47 altered building and zoning codes
to discourage SRO occupancy,48 and, from the mid-1970s until the
1980s, provided tax incentives to encourage the conversion of all
SRO units to (higher rent) apartments.49
The 1970s were particularly disastrous for SROs. By the end of
the decade, the City was granting tax breaks to landlords to convert
more than 40 SRO buildings a year.50 According to one study by
the State Assembly, between 1976 and 1981 the City’s tax program
caused the elimination of nearly two-thirds of all remaining SRO
units.51
The City’s tax program amplified the impact of market forces
pushing landlords away from SRO housing. Throughout the 1960s,
landlords were tempted to convert SROs into high rent apartments
as demand for luxury housing increased in previously marginal
neighborhoods. The interplay between market forces and
government policy was dynamic: landlords, responding to market
and government signals, quickly emptied and converted the most
desirable buildings. The remaining SROs (increasingly occupied
by regulated tenants) came to be seen as a poor investment and
were left to rot.52 As the condition of these SROs deteriorated,
tenants who could afford to leave moved out. The buildings were
increasingly occupied by “the poorest people.”53 The City’s tax
policies gave owners an extra push to remove these tenants and
when owners on the Upper West Side of Manhattan rented SROs to families with
children, largely Latino immigrants.”).
43 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 7.
44 See Gladwell, supra note 1.
45 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 27-2077, 27-2078 (2013).
46 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 7.
47 Id. at 7 (citing N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW 56 of 1967).
48 See Gladwell, supra note 1.
49 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 8.
50 Id.
51 Mark Malone, Homelessness in a Modern Urban Setting, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 749,
762 n.59 (1981).
52 Id. By the mid-1970s, more than one-fourth of all remaining SRO units
(approximately 13,000) were vacant because they were uninhabitable.
53  See Hevesi, supra note 30.
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convert the remaining buildings. As summarized by Anthony J.
Blackburn:
There were terribly deteriorated buildings . . . which could be
incredibly valuable if they were rented to young professionals
. . . . [Landlords forced SRO tenants out] by creating unimagin-
ably dreadful conditions in the building. They turned the heat
off, they let units to prostitutes [and] drug dealers. Some hired
thugs to simply throw tenants out . . . .54
Even more seriously, as the City admitted, the tax program en-
couraged a large number of owners to simply burn down their
SROs as a method of removing tenants.55
By the 1980s, the consequences of the anti-SRO crusade were
painfully evident: harassment, homelessness, and misery. As the
City later acknowledged, it had abjectly failed to plan for a post-
SRO New York. The ideological baggage of the anti-SRO move-
ment had effectively blinded it to the foreseeable consequences of
its policies.56 In 1965, an aide to then-Mayor Robert F. Wagner told
a reporter that the campaign to eliminate SRO housing was neces-
sary because “[n]o community should equate [SRO] housing with
the acceptable living standards of the 1960s [modern society].”57
Nearly three decades later, housing activist George McDonald
acerbically observed: “In the city of New York there were laws
passed to push the private sector out of the SRO business [and
eliminate SROs] on the theory that SROs were inhumane. Conse-
quently, people sleep on grates outside.”58
The scale of the disaster was staggering. By 1985, the City gov-
ernment had engineered the elimination of more than 100,000
units of affordable housing59—and replaced them with nothing.60
54 Hevesi, supra note 30 (direct quote of Dr. Anthony Blackburn). See also Debra S.
Vorsanger, New York City’s J-51 Program, Controversy and Revision, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
103, 143 (1983) (discussing the official reaction to a study that found a correlation
between J-51 eligibility in occupied SROs and arson).
55 Sydney H. Schanberg, New York; Arson and J-51, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/20/opinion/new-york-arson-and-j-51.html (dis-
cussing New York City Arson Task Force preliminary report confirming link between
J-51 benefits and arson in SROs).
56 Gladwell, supra note 1. In the article, Gladwell quotes Anne Teicher, the  deputy
director of SRO housing for the Mayor’s Office on Homelessness, as saying, “In the
context of the time, it [the 1955 SRO construction ban] may have made sense. They
were looking to upgrade certain neighborhoods that had a high concentration of this
kind of housing. But I don’t think people thought through that policy at the time and
realized what impact it would have.” Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 There is little dispute that SROs were overwhelmingly—even exclusively—con-
verted into high rent apartments. See, e.g., Lynette Holloway, With New Purpose and
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Between 1955 and 1985, wages had stagnated, poverty and unem-
ployment had increased, and the State had “dumped” more than
125,000 low-income patients from mental-health hospitals into the
City.61 Consequently, the homeless population spiked to by far the
worst levels in the country. Study after study found that large num-
bers of the homeless, including “about half” of homeless men en-
tering shelters in 1980, had lived in SROs before being pushed out
onto the street.62
Responding to the crisis, the City attempted to reverse course.
Over the course of several years, it cancelled the mandate to con-
vert new SRO units, stopped providing tax credits to convert SRO
buildings, passed a new tenant anti-harassment law, and funded le-
gal services offices dedicated to providing representation to SRO
tenants.63 Then, in 1985, the City Council passed an ambitious law
that temporarily banned the “conversion, alteration, or demoli-
tion” of SRO buildings.64 The ban was subsequently made perma-
nent and an anti-warehousing provision, which required landlords
to rent vacant units, was added.65
Unfortunately, the City’s actions were too little, too late. The
SRO housing stock was already critically depleted. Market forces
were pushing landlords harder than ever toward apartment conver-
sions. The anti-harassment law was ineffective as landlords violated,
and the City failed to effectively enforce, its provisions.66 Finally, in
1989 the conversion ban and anti-warehousing provisions were
struck down by the New York Court of Appeals.67
Since the Court of Appeals decision, the City’s SRO policy has
Look, SROs Make a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/
1996/11/10/nyregion/with-new-purpose-and-look-sro-s-make-a-comeback.html (dis-
cussing “wholesale conversion” of SROs into luxury apartments); BLACKBURN, supra
note 1, at 8 (“A 1980 audit of the J-51 program indicated that 41 SRO conversions
received J-51 abatements in FY 1979 alone.”).
60 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 8. See also Gladwell, supra note 1; Daley, supra note
17; MARKEE, supra note 25.
61 Malone, supra note 51, at 761–67 (discussing increasing unemployment and an
effort to empty mental-health hospitals).
62 Gladwell, supra note 1 (discussing a 1980 survey of men entering homeless shel-
ters); Daley, supra note 17 (reporting that “many studies have shown that large num-
bers of the city’s homeless once lived in rooming houses”).
63 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 7–9.
64 Id. at 1 (citing N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW 59 of 1985).
65 Id. at 9 (citing N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW 22 of 1986 and N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW 9 of 1987).
66 Id. at 7–8; see also Alan Finder, S.R.O. Tenants Lose Homes Despite Ban on Conver-
sions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/22/nyregion/
sro-tenants-lose-homes-despite-ban-on-conversions.html (“Residents of single-room-
occupancy hotels continue to be harassed and forced out . . . .”).
67 See Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 117 (1989).
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been in disarray. On the one hand, there is now broad recognition
that SROs are vitally important. The City regrets the loss of SROs
and tends to encourage the development of new units—largely in
non-profit, “supportive” SROs—to the limited extent permitted by
law.68 At the same time, there is a real sense that, with the numbers
having fallen so far, the whole situation is a lost cause. SROs also
continue to have a negative reputation: former Mayor Michael
Bloomberg’s recent proposals to build SRO-type housing—two-
room, 275-square-foot units designed for occupancy by single indi-
viduals at affordable rents—have studiously avoided the use of the
word “SRO.”69
The result, as illustrated by the following three examples, is a
toxic mix of paralysis and dysfunction.
A. Rent Regulation
The full and effective incorporation of SROs into the rent reg-
ulation system remains an unfinished project. The RSL and RSC
contain gaps and ambiguities that owners can manipulate to run
up rents and deregulate units.70 Tenants, who are left with primary
68 See, e.g., Alan Finder, Experts on Homeless Push for an Old Idea: S.R.O.’s in New York,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/09/nyregion/experts-
on-homeless-push-for-an-old-idea-sro-s-in-new-york.html. See also Esther B. Fein, Loans
to Build S.R.O. Units May Be Ended, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 1994), http://www.nytimes.
com/1994/03/14/nyregion/loans-to-build-sro-units-may-be-ended.html; Shawn G.
Kennedy, New Look for S.R.O.’s: Decent Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1995), http://
www.nytimes.com/1995/03/28/nyregion/new-look-for-sro-s-decent-housing.html;
Holloway, supra note 59; Hevesi, supra note 30; Harriet McDonald, Micro Units Proposed
to Make New York City Living Affordable, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/harriet-mcdonald/nyc-affordable-housing_b_2044666.html.
69 See Erin Durkin, Mayor Bloomberg Launches Contest to Stir Development of Tiny 300-
quare-foot Apartments for Singles, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 9, 2012), http://www.
nydailynews.com/new-york/mike-pushes-smaller-apts-young-singles-article-1.1110965;
see also Oshrat Carmiel, Manhattan to Get First ‘Micro-Unit’ Apartment Building, BLOOM-
BERG NEWS (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-22/new-york-
city-to-get-first-micro-unit-apartment-building.html.
70 The following two examples give some indication of the nature of the problem:
First, owners frequently attempt to take the large “vacancy increases” provided under
the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(5-a)
(McKinney 2013); id. § 2252.8(a). The Rent Guidelines Board has attempted to pro-
hibit owners from taking these increases. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., HOTEL OR-
DER #27 (June 23, 1997) (“No vacancy allowance is permitted under this order.
Therefore, the rents charged for [new] tenancies . . . may not exceed . . . rent[s] . . .
permitted under the applicable rent adjustment provided [in this Order].”). Similar
language appears in Hotel Orders #27 through #42, which span the period between
1997 and 2012. DHCR contests the RGB’s authority to control vacancy increases but
has no coherent policy of its own. The DHCR “Fact Sheet” applicable to SRO tenan-
cies indicates that SRO owners cannot take vacancy increases. See DEP’T OF HOMES &
CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #42: HOTELS, SROS, AND ROOMING HOUSES (rev. July
126 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:113
2011), available at http://www.nyshcr.org/Rent/FactSheets/orafac42.htm (“As a per-
manent tenant, an owner may not charge you more than the most recent rent
charged the prior permanent tenant . . . plus any lawful [RGB] guideline in-
creases. . . .”). In rent overcharge cases, however, DHCR has frequently permitted
vacancy increases without comment. More commonly, it has attempted to limit the
increases using a mechanical application of the statute that makes little sense. An
owner’s right to take a vacancy increase is triggered only when a tenant signs a va-
cancy lease. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.8(a) (2013) (“The legal
regulated rent for any vacancy lease [shall be] . . . .”). The amount of the increase is
set by a formula that turns upon (a) the length of the lease (one or two years); and
(b) certain provisions of the RGB’s Apartment Orders. The formula can be straight-
forwardly applied to all apartment tenancies. It cannot be applied to the vast majority
of SRO tenancies. All apartment owners are required to offer incoming tenants va-
cancy leases (one or two years); apartment tenants are required to sign the leases; and
both are subject to the RGB’s Apartment Orders. In contrast, SRO owners are not
required to offer incoming tenants leases and the term that must be offered in re-
sponse to a lease request is six months. SRO tenants are never required to sign a lease.
Finally, it is far from clear that the terms of RGB Apartment Orders can be applied to
SRO tenancies. For these reasons, the courts have become increasingly critical of
DHCR and any attempt to apply vacancy increases to SRO tenants. See, e.g., Hous. Dev.
Ass’n, LLC v. Gilpatrick, 910 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Table), 2010 WL 1691595, at *1 (App.
Term 1st Dep’t Apr. 28, 2010) (affirming lower court decision holding vacancy in-
creases do not apply to SROs). In Gilpatrick, the court noted:
Even were we to assume, in the petitioner owner’s favor, that . . . va-
cancy increases . . . are available to owners of stabilized hotel units as
well as stabilized apartment units, the vacancy increase formulas set
forth in the cited provisions and DHCR’s own interpretation of . . . sec-
tion 2522.8(a) confirm that no vacancy increase may be recovered un-
less a hotel owner offers an incoming tenant the option of a vacancy
lease for a one- or two-year term.
Id. Second, owners take advantage of the special nature of SRO tenancies to surrepti-
tiously deregulate units. The RSC states that the legal rent for a unit becomes the rent
“agreed to by the owner and the . . . tenant” if the unit was “vacant or temporarily
exempt” on the “base date.”  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2526.1(a)(3)(iii).
The “base date” is the date exactly four years prior to the date a tenant challenges a
particular unit’s rental amount. Id. § 2520.6(f). The RSC also provides that units are
deregulated once the rent goes above $2,500. Id. § 2520.11(r).  Owners claim that
these provisions permit the deregulation of any unit that has been registered as vacant
or exempt for four years: section 2526.1(a)(3)(iii) in combination with section
2520.6(f) permit the owner to unilaterally increase the legal (vacancy) rent for the
unit above $2,500; and section 2520.11(r) then mandates deregulation. Apartment
owners are rarely able to take advantage of this combination of provisions, as the
circumstances under which an apartment is “temporarily exempt” are limited. See, e.g.,
id. § 2520.11(f), (j), (m). Generally, the provisions come into play only where an
apartment has been held vacant for years or has been rented to a superintendent. See,
e.g., McCarthy v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 736 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2002) (stating that the “legal regulated rent was the rent listed in
the initial lease” where apartment was vacant on base date). The situation is very dif-
ferent, and much more easily manipulated, in SROs. SRO units are “temporarily ex-
empt” whenever they are not occupied by a permanent tenant—meaning whenever
they are occupied by a person who has not requested a lease or lived in the unit for
six months. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2520.11(g)(1), 2520.6(j),
2520.6(m); cf. id. § 2522.5(a)(2). It is, therefore, relatively easy for an SRO owner to
create the impression that the rent-setting provisions of the regulatory code have
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responsibility for enforcing the rent laws, are in a weak position to
oppose even the most blatant violations.71 Large numbers of SRO
tenants have no idea that SROs are regulated.72 SRO landlords uni-
formly ignore their obligation to provide occupants with a “Notice
of Rights.”73 Many refuse, without effective penalty, to even register
their buildings with DHCR, leaving tenants in a difficult limbo.74
As a result, even the most basic rent regulation protections fre-
quently are not enforced.75
been triggered. See id. § 2526.1(a)(3)(iii). Regulated commercial hotels claim that
they have rented “exclusively to tourists,” while other owners simply register rooms as
“temporarily exempt due to transient occupancy” no matter who is living there.
DHCR reports indicate that typically only one-half to two-thirds of all registered SROs
are registered as occupied and non-exempt. N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., EXPLANA-
TORY STATEMENT—HOTEL ORDER #39, at 8 (June 24, 2009) (indicating that 10,577 of a
total 22,827 units were registered as “non-exempt rent stabilized units”); N.Y.C. RENT
GUIDELINES BD., EXPLANATORY STATEMENT—HOTEL ORDER #42, at 8 (June 22, 2012)
(stating that 12,148 of a total of 17,663 units were registered as “rent stabilized”).
Though DHCR has been shockingly solicitous of this scheme, the courts have been
much more critical. See, e.g., Gordon v. 305 Riverside Corp., 941 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95–96
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012) (rejecting the deregulation argument in the apartment
context). As one lower court observed, owners cannot “create a loophole that under-
mines the goals of rent regulation” by manipulating the provisions of the Code to
convert “temporary exemptions” into “permanent[ ] deregulat[ion.]” 656 Realty, LLC
v. Cabrera, 911 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Table), 2009 WL 6489910, at *2 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Mar.
3, 2009). The authors note that section 2526.1(a)(3)(iii) of the regulatory code, at
least as interpreted and used by owners, contradicts several provisions of the RSL and
may be invalid.
71 The primary means of enforcement is for a tenant to file a complaint with
DHCR. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2527.1. DHCR has the authority to
bring proceedings on its own initiative but rarely does so.
72 SRO tenants’ ignorance of their rights was the primary justification for the crea-
tion of the Notice discussed in the next footnote and corresponding text. See 459 West
43rd St. Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 544 N.Y.S.2d 346, 349
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1989) (holding that the Notice “furthers [the] goal of insuring
that the rights of hotel occupants [are] not . . . frustrated due to the occupant’s
ignorance of the law”).
73 The authors have collectively worked with thousands of SRO tenants. Not a sin-
gle one has reported receiving the Notice. See also Weithman & Lebovits, supra note
12.
74 Tenants in unregistered buildings/rooms do not receive registration state-
ments. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2528.3. The statements are frequently
the prompt that causes tenants to contact legal services organizations about their rent
or to pursue rent overcharges on their own. Unregistered tenants that inquire about
their rent with DHCR are informed that the agency has “no record” of the unit—
which is commonly (though incorrectly) interpreted to mean that the unit is not reg-
ulated. Tenants that continue to pursue the matter cannot file an RA-89 rent over-
charge complaint. They must file a Request for an Administrative Determination. See
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2521. This is a more complicated proceeding—
and one which occasionally results in DHCR setting the “regulated” rent at whatever
the landlord happens to be charging the tenant at the time.
75 For example, DHCR data indicates that owners are increasing registered rents at
a rate that greatly exceeds that permitted under the Rent Guidelines Board Hotel
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B. Certificate of No Harassment (CONH)
The CONH program76 was enacted after the City’s reverse-
course on SRO housing in the early 1980’s.77 Under the program,
an owner cannot make certain changes to an SRO78 (i.e., demolish
or convert SRO units or change the number of bathrooms or kitch-
ens) without acquiring certification that there has been “[no] har-
assment of the lawful occupants of the property during [the
preceding three years].”79 Thus acquisition of a CONH is a neces-
sary step in any legal conversion of an SRO to a higher-rent use.
The program is primarily administered by the New York City De-
partment of Housing Preservation and Development (DHPD),
which investigates owners’ applications.80
The CONH program, in theory, presents a partial solution to
the City’s inability to simply bar all SRO conversions. It is meant to
balance the public need for affordable housing with landlords’ in-
terests and constitutional rights. In practice, and putting to one
side DHPD’s inability, or occasional unwillingness, to prevent own-
ers from simply ignoring the CONH requirement,81 the program
has been a disappointment. The most recent available data indi-
cates DHPD grants upwards of 99% of all applications.82
Orders. Between 2009 and 2012, median registered rents increased by approximately
four times the legal maximum. Compare N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT—HOTEL ORDER #39, at 9 (June 24, 2009) (estimating median registered
legal rent at $977.00) and N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., EXPLANATORY STATEMENT—
HOTEL ORDER #42 9 (June 22, 2012) (providing median registered legal rent of
$1,094.00), with N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., HOTEL ORDER #1, at 42 (showing that
the RGB approved a single 3% increase between 2009 and 2012). As discussed above,
DHCR registered rents do not equate to actual rents. See supra note 18 and accompa-
nying text. However, the fact that owners feel safe registering rents that are (at least in
the aggregate) flatly illegal should give some indication of the state of enforcement.
76 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2093 (2013).
77 The program was enacted through Local Law 19 (1983) (codified at N.Y.C. AD-
MIN. CODE § 27-2093).
78 The specific changes are set forth in DHPD rules regarding CONH. See N.Y.C.
DEP’T HOUS. PRESERV. & DEV, RULES PERTAINING TO CERTIFICATIONS OF NO HARASS-
MENT § 10-02 (2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/cer-
tification-of-no-harassment-rules.pdf.
79 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2093(a), (c).
80 Id.
81 In the authors’ professional experience, some owners have gone beyond simple
non-compliance and have begun attempting to use the CONH program as a means to
harass tenants. An owner will demolish part of the building (frequently the bath-
rooms) and then refuse to rebuild, (falsely) citing an inability to get permits because
of the CONH requirement. Owners’ attorneys occasionally use a variation on this
argument in lawsuits brought by tenants to force compliance with housing standards
laws.
82 Documents provided to MFY Legal Services, Inc. by DHPD show that the agency
denied 23 of the 1480 applications it processed between 1998 and 2008.
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The flaws in the CONH program are immense. DHPD is obli-
gated to prove harassment occurred in order to block an owner’s
application. The Agency’s ability to do this depends primarily upon
current tenants coming forward to provide information to its
staff.83 Harassment, by definition, involves conduct designed to
force tenants to forfeit their rights—and generally (at least in the
conversion context) to move out. A contradiction is, therefore,
built into the very base of the program. If a landlord is successful in
harassing its tenants, those tenants will probably no longer live at
the building and will be difficult for DHPD to reach; the Agency
will not be able to secure the information or testimony of tenants
who a landlord has successfully harassed into leaving. Therefore,
successful landlord harassment will be the most difficult to identify
and punish. In many cases, DHPD can prove harassment occurred
only where it was unsuccessful. Other factors add to the problem.
Owners routinely pull units off the market, holding them vacant
for long periods of time, until the entire building is “naturally”
emptied. The process can be sped up—and problematic informa-
tion suppressed—by paying off tenants. With an empty building
(or cooperating tenants), DHPD has no way to contradict an
owner’s assertion of no harassment.84 The value of a CONH—
which can be the difference between owning a low-rent, regulated
SRO and a boutique hotel85—more than offsets the cost of the lost
rent and bribes.
C. Homelessness Policy
The City’s response to the homelessness crisis threatens the
remaining stock of regulated SRO housing. The Department of
Homeless Services (DHS) and other City agencies are increasingly
contracting with SRO owners to temporarily house homeless peo-
83 Documents provided to MFY Legal Services by DHPD indicate that the vast ma-
jority of information contained in investigation files comes from current tenants. It
appears that investigators do make an effort to reach out to prior tenants, but receive
few substantive responses.
84 These statements are based upon the authors’ discussions with DHPD officials
and their experience investigating CONH applications.
85 For example, between 2008 and 2009 the owners of the Riverview Hotel (113
Jane Street) received a CONH that cleared the way for its conversion into a boutique
hotel. At “The Jane,” which now includes a popular bar, rooms that used to rent for as
little as $215.00 per month cost $99.00 a night. Christopher Gray, Popeye Slept Here and
Now Olive Oyl Can, Too, N.Y TIMES (July 14, 2009),  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
02/09/nyregion/for-some-landlords-real-money-in-the-homeless.html; see also Dan
Berry, On Bowery, Cultures Clash as the Shabby Meet the Shabby Chic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/us/at-bowery-house-hotel-flophouse-
aesthetic-of-old.html (discussing the conversion of the Prince Hotel).
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ple.86 Individuals placed through these programs have no perma-
nent rights to their rooms—they cannot become stabilized
tenants.87 The City thus helps create the problem it claims it is
trying to solve: it removes affordable, regulated units from the mar-
ket—increasing homelessness—and converts them into unregu-
lated, temporary homeless “warehouses.”88
The incentives the City provides to induce participation in
what has become a private shelter system are both staggering and
puzzling. The City guarantees SRO owners a profit and pays rents
that exponentially exceed the stabilized rates for rooms—as much
as $3,000 per month as far back as the 1980s.89 This willingness to
spend contrasts sharply with City policy toward more cost-effective
nonprofit shelters and rent subsidy programs. City funding for
nonprofits is relatively modest and “constantly at risk.”90 In 2011,
the City, pleading poverty, terminated rent subsidies for previously
homeless families that had found permanent housing.91 The City
86 The Coalition for the Homeless has released multiple pamphlets on this issue.
See generally LINDSEY DAVIS, COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, WAREHOUSING THE HOMELESS:
THE RISING USE OF ILLEGAL BOARDING HOUSES TO SHELTER HOMELESS NEW YORKERS
(2008), available at http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/pages/warehousing-the-
homeless.
87 Subsections (b) and (f) of section 2520.11 provide that housing accommoda-
tions owned, operated, or leased by the United States or New York State government
or pursuant to governmental funding in certain circumstances are exempted from
rent stabilization. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11(b), (f) (2013). Re-
cently the Appellate Division overturned an Appellate Term decision that denied an
SRO occupant rent-stabilized status when the tenant was placed in the unit by the City
as part of its homelessness prevention plan. See Branic Int’l Realty Corp. v. Pitt, 963
N.Y.S.2d 210, 213–15 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013).  At the time of publishing, the Ap-
pellate Division’s decision in this matter is on appeal before the New York Court of
Appeals. While this is a positive decision and hopefully marks a turn in New York
courts’ willingness to waive the clear protections of the RSC, the City and the State
will likely continue to whittle away the SRO housing stock with programs that can
apply subsections (b) and (f).
88 The characterization is from Coalition for the Homeless. See DAVIS, supra note
86.
89  See, e.g., Anna Quindlen, ‘Give Us a Shot at Something,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 1988),
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/31/books/give-us-a-shot-at-something.html (“The
city of New York spends as much as $3,000 a month for a family to live in a welfare
hotel . . . .”); Joseph Berger, For Some Landlords, Real Money in the Homeless, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/nyregion/for-some-landlords-
real-money-in-the-homeless.html (“The city’s Department of Homeless Services pays
many times the amount the rooms would usually rent for – spending $3,000 a month
for each threadbare room without a bathroom or kitchen . . . .”).
90 Bobby Watts, Letter to the Editor: Housing the Homeless, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/opinion/housing-the-homeless.html.
91 See Michael Howard Saul, End of Rent Subsidies Has Critics Pouncing, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 4, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702038899045772015
93329240970.html.
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still has the money, however, to pay a premium to displace “long-
term [SRO] residents.”92 As a policy analyst for Coalition for the
Homeless observed:
The crisis that’s causing the city to open so many new [SRO]
shelters is mostly of the mayor’s own making. . . . Instead of
moving families out of shelters and into permanent housing, as
previous mayors did, the city is now paying millions to landlords
with a checkered past of harassing low-income tenants and fail-
ing to address hazardous conditions.93
This problem shows no signs of abating. In conversation with
the authors, SRO operators and their attorneys have suggested that
capitalizing on City homelessness prevention subsidies is the most
profitable operating strategy for many SROs, and thus the strategy
that they plan to pursue. One SRO operator’s attorney lamented
the protections offered by rent stabilization because they made it
more difficult to take advantage of these subsidies. History has
shown that when City policy incentivizes the conversion of SRO
units, owners will jump at the opportunity; current homeless policy
is thus repeating past mistakes.
The problem does not stop there. Over the last several years,
DHS and other City agencies have cooperated with an even more
predatory scheme. In increasing numbers, SRO buildings have
been (unlawfully) taken over by so-called Three-Quarter Houses.94
These operations falsely hold themselves out as supportive housing
to draw tenants from prisons, homeless shelters, and so forth.95
Three-Quarter Houses uniformly deny residents rent stabilization,
and even basic tenancy rights. Three-Quarter House tenants report
that harassment and other abuses are common.96 Nonetheless, un-
til recently, the City looked to Three-Quarter Houses as a means to
reduce the shelter population.
To make matters worse, anecdotal evidence suggests that
92 Berger, supra note 89.
93 Id.
94 Patrick Arden, Lawsuits Target Three-Quarter Operators, CITY LIMITS (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://www.bkbureau.org/2012/03/07/lawsuits-target-three-quarter-operators/.
95 Patrick Arden, Deep Concerns about ‘Three-Quarter’ Housing, CITY LIMITS (Mar. 9,
2012), http://www.bkbureau.org/2012/03/07/deep-concerns-about-three-quarter-
housing/.
96 Cindy Rodriguez, Drug Rehab for Housing: Alleged Scheme Targets City’s Most Vulner-
able, WNYC (Dec. 15, 2010), www.wnyc.org/story/104149-jerome-david/. See also PRIS-
ONER REENTRY INST., JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIM. JUSTICE, THREE QUARTER HOUSES: THE
VIEW FROM THE INSIDE 19–24 (2013), http://johnjayresearch.org/pri/files/2013/10/
PRI-TQH-Report.pdf (reporting, based on multiple interviews with Three-Quarter
House tenants, severe and persistent abuses such as illegal evictions, verbal and physi-
cal harassment, and coerced participation in certain treatment programs).
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Medicaid fraud may be rampant in Three-Quarter House opera-
tions. Many operators require Three-Quarter House residents to
participate in substance abuse or other so-called rehabilitative pro-
grams in order to maintain residency in a facility. The choice of
which program to attend is not left to the resident. Rather, the
operator forces the resident to attend a program that it either runs
or with which it has a relationship. Each time that the resident vis-
its the program, Medicaid makes a payment on her behalf. If a resi-
dent refuses to attend the program, she risks being evicted.
IV. NEW YORK CITY’S PERMANENT HOUSING CRISIS
“The council hereby finds that a serious public emergency continues to exist in
the housing of a considerable number of persons within the city of New York
. . . [and] that such emergency [has] necessitated the intervention of federal,
state and local government in order to prevent speculative, unwarranted
and abnormal increases in rents. . . .”97
The City’s devastating SRO policies must be viewed in the
context of—and as a cause of—its ongoing housing crisis. More
than sixty years after the federal government first intervened in the
City’s housing market and froze rents, a “serious public emergency
continues to exist in the housing of a considerable number of
persons within the city of New York . . . .”98
New York City’s low vacancy rate provides some measure of the
severity of the housing crisis. Vacancy rates are frequently used as a
general measure of the health and viability of a city’s rental
market.99 As approximately 68% of New York City residents live in
rental housing—more than double the national average—the
importance of the City’s rental market to overall housing
conditions cannot be overstated.100 Nationally, the average vacancy
rate has ranged between approximately 9% and 11% in recent
years.101 The average vacancy rate for large cities is frequently
97 Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 (codified at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE LAW § 26-501
(2013)).
98 Id.
99 The RSL, for example, uses the vacancy rate as a measure of the severity of the
housing crisis.
100 N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE, RENTS THROUGH THE ROOF: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF UNAFFORDABLE RENTS IN NEW YORK CITY (2012), available at http://
comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Rents-through-the-Roof.pdf.
New York City homeowners are much wealthier than most City residents. Compare LEE,
supra note 19, at 5, with id. at 4.
101 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP 2012, http://
www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/ann12ind.html (follow “Rental and Homeowner
Vacancy Rates by Area” hyperlink to the right of “Table 1” under “Detailed Tables”).
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above 10%.102 In New York City, the vacancy rate is just above
3%.103
The shortage of rental units is inextricably tied to a crisis of
affordability. Housing is considered affordable if it costs less than
30% of household income.104  The median household in New York
City pays 33.8% of its income for rent.105 Fully one-third of renter
households pay 50% or more of their income for rent.106
Although these citywide figures are grim, the reality is that
New York City’s housing crisis does not affect all residents equally.
The City’s housing market is heavily skewed in favor of high-
income households. Crisis conditions are concentrated toward the
bottom of the market where a severe shortage of affordable units
leads to very low vacancy rates and very high rent burdens. Well
under half of the City’s rental units are affordable to the median
renter household.107 For poor households, defined as those living
at or below 50% of the Area Media Income (AMI),108 there is a
shortfall of affordable housing on the magnitude of several
hundred thousand units.109
102 FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POL’Y, KEY FINDINGS ON THE
AFFORDABILITY OF RENTAL HOUSING FROM NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND VACANCY
SURVEY 2008, at 2 (2009) [hereinafter RENTAL HOUSING AFFORDABILITY], available at
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Key_Findings.pdf.
103 LEE, supra note 19, at 3.
104 See, e.g., Affordable Housing, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. (2013), http://
www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (“Families
who pay more than 30 percent of their income for housing are considered cost
burdened . . . .”).
105 LEE, supra note 19, at 7. The figure is calculated as gross, not contract, rent.
Based on House and Vacancy Survey (HVS) data from 2011, the Furman Center
concludes that 55.7% and 58% of market rate and rent-stabilized tenants pay over
30% of their household income to rent. See N.Y.C. RENT STABILIZATION, supra note 1.
106 LEE, supra note 19, at 7
107 Id. at 4. According to the 2011 HVS, the median annual income for renter
households was $38,500. An affordable monthly rent for these households is thus
$962.50. There were 14,383 vacant units renting for $999 (contract rent) or less per
month and 807,719 occupied units renting for $999 (contract rent) or less per
month. There were a total of 2,172,634 rental units (occupied and vacant) in 2011.
This means that approximately 37.8% of rental units are affordable to the median
renter household.
108 Except where otherwise indicated, AMI in this paper refers to AMI as
determined by the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2011 New York City Housing and Vacancy
Survey, see supra note 1, and used in the 2009 study by the Furman Center for Real
Estate and Urban Policy. See generally N.Y.C. RENTAL HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, supra
note 102. This measure of the AMI may be different than that set by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). See cf. HUD Program Income
Limits, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/
il.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
109 Data compiled in the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2005–2007 American Community
Survey indicates that there were well in excess of 880,000 households with incomes at
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There is no housing crisis for those who can afford high rents.
At no point during the last decade has the vacancy rate for high-
rent units (currently greater than $2,500 per month110) fallen
below the crisis-threshold of 5%;111 it has often matched or
exceeded the combined urban and non-urban rate for the entire
Northeast region of the United States (7.3% in 2012).112
Meanwhile, the vacancy rate for units affordable to those living at
the AMI is below 4%,113 the rate for units affordable to households
living at or below 50% of the AMI is approximately 1%,114 and the
rate for units affordable to households living at or below the
poverty line is less than 1%.115
The degree of rent burden experienced by households
predictably tracks the availability of affordable units. As of 2005,
the median rent burden for the wealthiest, middle, and poorest
thirds of renter households was 16%, 27%, and 44%,
respectively.116 In 2008, approximately 50% of low-income New
Yorkers paid more than 50% of their income for rent.117 Jumping
forward to 2011, the median rent burden for poor renters in
private, unsubsidized housing was 68%.118
This places additional stress on low-income families. After
paying rent, “poor renters . . . [are] left with an average of just
$4.40 per household member per day to pay for food,
transport[ation], medical and education costs, and all other
or below $25,000 per year, which is roughly equivalent to 50% of the AMI ($24,020).
But the Furman Center reports that, as of 2008, there were only 364,961 units
affordable to families living at or below 50% of the AMI. See RENTAL HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY, supra note 102, at 4. It is worth nothing that, as early as 2002, Coalition
for the Homeless was already reporting a shortfall of more than 400,000 “low-cost
rental housing units.” PATRICK MARKEE, COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, HOUSING A
GROWING CITY: NEW YORK’S BUST IN BOOM TIMES 57–58 (2002), available at http://coal
home.3cdn.net/9cde22b5c4c86f39af_0cm6ynl8u.pdf.
110 See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE LAW § 26-504.2 (2013), available at http://72.0.151.116/
nyc/adcode/Title26C4_26-504_2.asp.
111 New York State law defines a “crisis” as a vacancy rate of less than 5%. N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW § 8623(a) (McKinney 2013).
112 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 101.
113 LEE, supra note 19, at 4 (vacancy rate of 3.61%).
114 Id. (vacancy rate for less than $800 per month is 1.1%).
115 Id.
116 VICTOR BACH & THOMAS J. WATERS, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, MAKING THE RENT: WHO’S
AT RISK 3 (2008), available at http://b.3cdn.net/nycss/2ad98a52b2cf4d9889_j0m6i
6jhq.pdf.
117 RENTAL HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, supra note 102, at Table F (noting that in 2008
almost 80% of low-income renters in the private rental market were paying more than
30% of their income on rent, and nearly half were paying more than 50% of their
income on rent).
118 See LEE, supra note 19 at 4, 22 (¶ C1 and Table 12).
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necessities.”119 Because of this situation, even very small increases
in rent can be devastating.
The crisis is only getting worse for low-income households.
Between 2002 and 2008, the only segment of the City’s housing
stock that grew was that affordable to the relatively affluent (150%
of the AMI and up).120 The number of units affordable to the
median renter household decreased by more than 15%.121  Due to
these losses, the bottom third of the population can now afford
approximately 17.3% of the (rental) housing stock.122
At least part of this crisis is attributable to the nature of the
City’s “affordable housing” programs. Frequently these programs
target the construction of units that are not only unaffordable to
poor New Yorkers, but are actually unaffordable to the median
renter household. An important goal of former Mayor Michael
Bloomberg’s affordable housing plan (the New Housing
Marketplace Plan) was the construction of housing for “low-
income households.”123  However, the Plan defined a “low-income
household” as one earning less than 80% of the Area Median
Income determined by the U.S. Department of Housing and
119 VICTOR BACH & THOMAS J. WATERS, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, MAKING THE RENT:
BEFORE AND AFTER THE RECESSION 3 (2013), available at http://b.3cdn.net/nycss/
2b541395152c0a6d1e_vpm6b5w43.pdf. The situation for poor renters has devolved
since 2005, when a poor household had just under $5 to spend on necessities after
paying the rent. BACH & WATERS, supra note 116, at 9.
120 RENTAL HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, supra note 102, at 4.
121 Id.
122 Data from the Fiscal Policy Institute (in 2005 dollars) indicates that the upper
income boundary for the bottom third of households was between $14,115 and
$26,430. TRUDI RENWICK, FISCAL POL’Y INST., PULLING APART IN NEW YORK: AN ANALYSIS
OF INCOME TRENDS IN NEW YORK STATE 13 (2008), available at http://www.
fiscalpolicy.org/FPI_PullingApartInNewYork.pdf. In 2005 approximately 18% of the
housing stock was affordable to households with an income of $20,000 or below (50%
AMI) and in 2008 approximately 17.3% of the housing stock was affordable to
households with an income of $22,500 or below (50% AMI). See RENTAL HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY, supra note 102, at 4.
123 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRESERV. & DEV., A GUIDE TO THE PROGRAMS AND
SERVICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 5 (2004),
available at https://partner.hpdnyc.org/whalecom81b846a8d7ea6a1bb1b6bf/whale
com0/download/311/HPD/HPD%20Guide%20to%20Programs%20and%20Servi
ces.pdf (estimating that “46% of the new and preserved units” under the New
Housing Marketplace Plan will be affordable to low-income households). See also
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRESERV. & DEV., THE NEW HOUSING MARKETPLACE: CREATING
HOUSING FOR THE NEXT GENERATION (2002), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
hpd/downloads/pdf/10yearHMplan.pdf; N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRESERV. & DEV.,
MAYOR BLOOMBERG’S AFFORDABLE HOUSING PLAN 2 (2009), available at http://www.
nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/New-Housing-Market-Place-Plan.pdf (“Nearly
three quarters of the units created under the Mayor’s plan will serve low-income fami-
lies . . . .”).
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Urban Development—a measure different than the AMI used in
the U.S. Census Bureau’s Housing and Vacancy Studies and
referenced above.124 In 2008, 80% of the HUD-AMI for a single-
person household was $43,000 and for a family of four was
$61,450.125 According to the Census Bureau’s 2008 Housing
Vacancy Survey, the median renter household in New York City
had an income of $36,300.126 Therefore, the City can
simultaneously construct “low-income housing” while still doing
nothing to address the real housing crisis.  In fact, between 2004
and 2013, less than one-third of the “affordable housing” built or
preserved in New York City was affordable to the median renter
household.127
V. SROS AND THE CRISIS
“The people you see sleeping under bridges used to be valued members of the
housing market. They aren’t anymore.”128
The City’s turn against SRO housing shaped the nature of the
current housing crisis. To provide perspective, the approximately
175,000 SRO units the City eliminated from 1955 on were roughly
equivalent in number to New York’s entire public housing
system.129 The number of units affordable to low-income residents
is fully one-third lower than it would have been had SRO housing
124 Compare A GUIDE TO THE PROGRAMS AND SERVICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 123 with supra text
accompanying note 20 and ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV. INC., REAL
AFFORDABILITY: AN EVALUATION OF THE BLOOMBERG HOUSING PROGRAM AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY 20 (2011), available
at http://www.anhd.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Real-Affordability-Evalua
tion-of-the-Bloomberg-Housing-Program2.pdf.
125 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 2008 ADJUSTED HOME INCOME LIMITS 2
(2008), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/programs/
home/limits/income/2008/ny.pdf.
126 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SER. IA, TBL. 9, 2008 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND
VACANCY SURVEY (2008), http://www.census.gov/housing/nychvs/data/2008/ser1a.
html (follow link at “2007 Total Household Income”).
127 Based on the 2008 income figures cited above, it may be assumed that median
renter household income is generally 60% or less of HUD AMI. Only 34.2% of the
“affordable housing” claimed by the Bloomberg administration was affordable to
households at 60% HUD AMI. See REAL AFFORDABILITY, supra note 124, at 20.
Similarly, though applying a slightly different focus, approximately two-thirds of the
“affordable housing” was “too expensive for the majority of local neighborhoos
residents.” Id. at 2.
128 Direct quote of Mary Brosnahan, executive director of Coalition for the
Homeless, as reported by Gladwell, supra note 1.
129 The New York City Housing Authority estimates that there are 178,914 public
housing units as of March 1, 2013. About NYCHA Fact Sheet, N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., http:/
/www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/about/factsheet.shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
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been preserved.130
SROs remain an integral part of the low-income market.
Although rent-regulated SROs are a tiny fraction of the City’s total
rental stock, they still make up a significant percentage (5 to 15%)
of all units affordable to poor New Yorkers.131 Thus, the ongoing—
though slowed—loss of units continues to have a devastating
impact upon the availability of truly “affordable” housing.
And then there are the illegal units: the City’s destruction of
legal, regulated SROs caused an explosion in the number of illegal
SROs. Illegally subdivided apartments and other SRO-type units
currently house as many as 500,000 poor New Yorkers.132 The City
ignores their existence, including the danger they present, because
it desperately needs these units. City officials rightly contend that
illegal SROs present a “serious danger” to tenants and
neighborhoods,133 yet the City depends on illegal SROs to ward off
a homeless crisis that would “dwarf” anything seen before.134 As The
New York Times reported in 2008:
For decades, Bowery flophouses [one type of SRO]—typically
offering as little as a bed in a cubicle with wire-mesh ceilings—
were home to some of the city’s most down and out. But as rents
began to rise, the flophouses were converted to condos. . . .
. . . .
[Now] illegally converted houses [are] being used [to house the
poor] . . . .
. . . .
[T]he Buildings Department alone has issued more than 226
violations to 47 boarding houses for illegal use as a “homeless
shelter,” “single-room occupancy,” or “rooming house[ ]”
. . . .135
130 See RENTAL HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, supra note 102, at 4. Approximately 17% of
the rental housing stock (3,352,041) is affordable to the bottom third. The 175,000
lost SRO units represent approximately 31% of the affordable units in the City.
131 The authors estimate that SROs constitute between 5% and 10% of all units
affordable to households earning less than 50% of the AMI and a significantly higher
percentage of all units affordable to households living below the poverty line.
132 Manny Fernandez, Partitioned Apartments Are Risky, But Common in New York, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/nyregion/23partitions.
html; see also Leslie Kaufman & Manny Fernandez, Illegal Boarding Houses Pit City’s
Laws Against Lack of Alternatives, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/01/22/nyregion/22homeless.html.
133 Javier C. Hernandez, City to Crack Down on Illegally Divided Apartments, N.Y. TIMES
CITY ROOM BLOG (June 7, 2011), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/
city-to-crack-down-on-illegally-divided-apartments/.
134 Hevesi, supra note 30, at 5.
135 Kaufman & Fernandez, supra note 132. The HVS study also concluded that
“[t]he crowding situation in the City was serious in 2011.” LEE, supra note 19, at 8.
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VI. BRINGING SROS BACK
The solution to the housing crisis is in some sense simple: cre-
ate more truly affordable housing. There is certainly room, and a
need, for more moderately priced, “gentrified” SROs like former
Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s “small apartments.” However, to have
a real impact on the housing crisis, the City needs to dedicate sig-
nificant resources to promoting the construction of low-rent units.
Over the last several decades the City has spent136 hundreds of mil-
lions, if not billions, of dollars subsidizing the construction, renova-
tion, and rehabilitation of high-rent and luxury housing.137 These
dollars would be better spent subsidizing private (low-rent) SRO
development or—perhaps preferably—building SROs for public
ownership.138
Any resolution of the City’s housing crisis will require a sea
change in SRO policy. It will take years to rebuild the SRO housing
11.5% of renter households were crowded in 2011, with rates as high as 14.7% in one
category of rent-stabilized units. Id.
136 This spending has primarily taken the form of tax exemptions.
137 VICTOR BACH & THOMAS J. WATERS, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, UPGRADING PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AT PUBLIC EXPENSE: THE RISING COST OF J-51, at 6 (2012), available at http://
b.3cdn.net/nycss/b3347d0b9b1c3a863d_ffm6ivrrh.pdf. This policy brief concludes
that a significant percentage of J-51 benefits, see id. at 1 (explaning J-51 tax breaks), go
to condos, co-ops, and “apartments with very high rents.” Id. at 6. The program has
subsidized the “gentrif[ication of] Upper Manhattan.” Id. See also Michael Powell,
Luxe Builders Chase Dreams of Property Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2013), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/nyregion/luxe-builders-chase-dreams-of-property-
tax-exemptions.html; Elizabeth A. Harris, As Prices Soar to Buy a Luxury Address, the Tax
Bills Don’t, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/nyre-
gion/many-high-end-new-york-apartments-have-modest-tax-rates.html (discussing
State and City laws that subsidize the construction of luxury buildings and mandate
their systematic undervaluation for property tax purposes and concluding that “the
overall city valuation for condos and co-ops is only about 20 percent of what it would
be were the city allowed to” accurately appraise the value of luxury buildings).
138 Other than noting that new SRO units would need to be low-rent in order to
have a real impact on the housing crisis, a discussion of the ideal regulatory and
ownership structure of new units is beyond the scope of this Article. We strongly be-
lieve that any new units should be permanently subject to rent regulation or some
other rent-setting mechanism. This would require making changes to the housing
and rent regulation laws. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE LAW § 26-504 (2013) (excluding
most new construction from regulation). Under existing law, new units built with pub-
lic subsidies would probably be temporarily subject to regulation. See N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11(c), (o)–(p) (2013); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE LAW § 27-
2077. Publicly owned units would not be regulated, but would have other distinct
benefits. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11(b). Public housing is, in
theory at least, subject to greater democratic control; rents for public housing are
generally set at an affordable rate by law; public housing residents enjoy tenancy
rights that are in many ways superior to those of even regulated tenants; and the
conversion or demolition of public housing is, in some ways, more difficult than with
private, affordable housing.
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stock, and the recommendations that follow are meant as the first
step down that path.
While the return of SRO housing may provoke opposition, the
facts are clear: New York City needs SROs—and SROs are not go-
ing away. SROs are as old as the modern City, and demand for
basic, no-frills housing is a constant. The City’s half-century-long
attempt to eliminate SROs has contributed to unprecedented
homelessness, and led to the explosive return of illegal and unsafe
units. Opposition to SRO living must be reconsidered in light of
the unique benefits SRO hotels provide.
A. Lift the Ban on the Construction of New SRO Units
The first step in restoring SRO housing is to lift the ban on the
construction of new SRO units. In addition to allowing new units to
be built, this change would permit the legalization of the existing
yet illegal SRO stock.139
Even without the construction of a single new unit, the City
would benefit from the legalization of existing SRO-type housing.
New York City relies on illegally converted SROs in order to house
its citizens. Refusing to acknowledge the necessity of these units
only strips residents of rights and exacerbates public safety
problems. Legalization would simultaneously help remove a public
safety threat and boost the stock of affordable, regulated hous-
ing.140 Currently, residents of illegal SROs have few rights and po-
139 The construction ban denies tenants living in illegal SROs remedies available to
tenants living in all other types of illegal units. Non-SRO tenants are entitled to come
forward and claim stabilization rights. It would then be the landlord’s burden to
prove that the unit cannot be legalized if she wishes to evict. See Commercial Hotel,
Inc. v. White, 752 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780–81 (App. Term 2d Dep’t 2002); 840 West End
Ave. v. Zurkowski, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 28, 1991, at 24, col. 4 (App. Term 1st Dep’t.). The
situation is less clear with SROs. Because New York Multiple Dwelling Law § 248 and
subsections 22-2077 and 27-2078 of the New York Administrative Code make all new
SROs illegal by definition, this route appears foreclosed to SRO tenants. At least one
court has ruled (in an unreported decision) that a regulated tenancy can be created
in an illegal SRO, though the decision does not specifically address the construction
ban. See Wright v. Lewis, 873 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Table), 2008 WL 4681929 (Sup. Ct. Kings
Cnty. Oct. 23, 2008). However, the right is far from clearly defined and an amend-
ment of the legal framework would significantly advance the goal of rebuilding the
SRO housing stock. Especially in the outer boroughs, a building’s particular zoning
classification can also be a legal hurdle.
140 In 2008, Chhaya Community Development Corporation, together with the Pratt
Center for Community Development and Citizens Housing & Planning Council, re-
leased two excellent reports on the legalization of currently illegal dwelling units. The
reports primarily discuss the legalization of basement units in the outer boroughs, but
provide a compelling argument for such legalization and an essential perspective on
illegal dwelling units. See generally CHHAYA CMTY. DEV. CORP. & CITIZENS HOUS. & PLAN-
140 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:113
tentially face illegal eviction, or evacuation, if they report building
violations. If the new-construction ban were lifted, many previously
illegal SRO tenants would automatically qualify for rent-stabiliza-
tion protection.141 In the event the “legalized” units violated build-
ing codes, a landlord would have to prove that curing the violations
was either physically or economically impossible before residents
could be evicted.142 Given these protections, it is more likely that
tenants would report building violations to the City.
Changing the City’s housing laws to permit the legalization of
SRO units would not be without precedent. The current housing
crisis closely mirrors the crisis that drove New York City to legalize
the “new SROs” in the 1930s and 1940s. This process involved ma-
jor changes to the City’s Multiple Dwelling Law.143
B. Preserve Existing Units
In addition to creating new units, City and State need to stem
the loss of existing affordable units. Affordable units are lost in two
primary ways: (1) through demolition or conversion, which impli-
cates the CONH program, or (2) through illegal rent increases,
which implicates the rent regulation laws.
The CONH program needs to be significantly reformed in or-
der to bring policy into line with real-world conditions. As dis-
cussed above, one of the primary deficiencies in the program
revolves around DHPD’s inability to effectively investigate harass-
ment in empty, or near empty, buildings. This issue could be dealt
NING COUNCIL, ILLEGAL DWELLING UNITS: A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF AFFORDABLE HOUS-
ING IN NEW YORK CITY (2008), available at http://www.chhayacdc.org/pdf/Chhaya_re
portHPD.pdf; CHHAYA CMTY. DEV. CORP. & PRATT CTR. FOR CMTY. DEV., NEW YORK’S
HOUSING UNDERGROUND: A REFUGE AND RESOURCE (2008), available at http://www.
prattcenter.net/sites/default/files/housing_underground_0.pdf.
141 This assumes most illegal SROs are in buildings that were constructed before
1974.
142 See, e.g., McDonnell v. Sir Prize Contracting Corp., 300 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (App.
Div. 2d Dep’t 1969) (holding that tenant could not be evicted where landlord failed
to prove that removing relevant violations would be unduly burdensome or economi-
cally impossible); Seckin v. Davenport, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1999 at 31, col. 2 (App. Term
2d Dep’t) (same); K&G Co. v. Reyes, 276 N.Y.S.2d 20, 23–24 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1966)
(interpreting parallel requirement in Rent Control Law to hold the same).
143 The Pack Law, which legalized the conversion of apartments into SROs, was
driven in major part by the Survey of Vacancies in Class A Multiple Dwellings, con-
ducted by the City’s Tenement House Department in 1933. The survey found high
vacancy rates (over 14%) in higher-rent, larger apartments at a time when affordable
housing was in short supply, and homelessness was a major problem. N.Y.C. CITIZENS
HOUS. PLANNING COUNCIL, SURVEY OF VACANCIES IN CLASS-A-MULTIPLE DWELLINGS 3
(1933), available at http://www.chpcny.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/1933_
NYC_Vacancy_Study.pdf.
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with by shifting the burden of proof. A presumption of harassment
could be imposed on any CONH application where more than
30% of the building is empty, or where more than half of existing
tenants moved out during the preceding three years.144
The program could be further strengthened by tightening the
definition of harassment. DHPD has complained that it is forced to
prove that an owner “intended” to harass tenants by not keeping
the building up to code. In light of the history neglect has played
in SRO landlord-tenant relations, the law should be amended to
make neglect, whatever the owner’s intent, a form of harassment.
Moreover, a presumption of harassment should apply in any case
where: (1) a “C” violation (the most serious) has not been timely
cured; or (2) a tenant has moved out of the building while there
were more than five unresolved building violations per resident. In
addition, failure to provide occupants with the Notice of Rights—
an attempt to deny those rights if there ever was one—should be
explicitly codified as a form of harassment.
Finally, to supplement DHPD’s investigative capacity, and to
give tenants a more active voice in the program, current and for-
mer tenants145 should be made parties to CONH applications. Te-
nants should be allowed to appear at hearings with counsel as
named parties rather than solely as witnesses DHPD may call at its
own discretion. They should be allowed to submit evidence, ex-
amine witnesses, and appeal adverse decisions. Owners should be
compelled to pay tenants’ legal fees in any case where an applica-
tion is denied.
The rent regulation laws also need to be reformed. The RSL
and RSC need to be clarified to adequately account for differences
between SROs and apartments. Loopholes that allow landlords to
improperly increase SRO rents, or deregulate units, need to be
closed. To start, the vacancy increase and “transient deregulation”
schemes discussed in Part III above (particularly footnote 70),
need to be prohibited. Vacancy increases allow SRO owners to take
a permanent increase to the regulated rent when a unit becomes
vacant. In light of SROs’ unique position in the low-income mar-
ket, and a long history of owner abuse, this increase needs to be
explicitly prohibited. In the case of transient deregulation, owners
144 The presumption would (a) recognize that a previously occupied building
rarely “naturally” empties, and (b) reflect the overwhelming public interest in preserv-
ing existing SRO housing.
145 By “preceding three years,” we mean the three-year period prior to the submis-
sion of the CONH application.
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claim the RSC allows them to unilaterally raise the “regulated” rent
after a room has been registered (accurately or not) as “tempora-
rily exempt due to transient occupancy” for a period of four years.
If the owner chooses to set the rent above the high-rent destabiliza-
tion threshold (currently $2,500 per month), the unit is effectively
deregulated solely as a result of a period of transient occupancy.
As the issue of transient deregulation suggests, the rent regis-
tration system for SROs needs to be overhauled. Currently, SRO
owners are required to file the same annual registration statements
with DHCR as apartment owners. This makes little sense as SRO
tenancies are different than apartment tenancies. The existing re-
gistration system allows SRO owners to use the dual, transient-per-
manent nature of SRO tenancies to deny SRO tenants their rights.
Owners routinely register units as “temporarily exempt due to tran-
sient occupancy” even while they are occupied by permanent te-
nants.146 Because DHCR checks the accuracy of registration
statements, and because SRO tenants are poorly positioned to po-
lice owner conduct, there is relatively little risk to this scheme.147
However, as discussed above,148 the rewards are significant: a “tem-
porarily exempt” registration can make it more difficult, or impos-
sible, for a tenant to prove they are stabilized or are being
overcharged. A simple change could help prevent this abuse. SRO
owners should be required to register a regulated rent for each
room, each year. In other words, each annual SRO registration
should set forth the last rent paid by a permanent, rent regulated
tenant for the room. This “room rent,” rather than the accidental,
and frequently false, regulatory status of a former occupant, would
determine the outcome of any complaint. The legal regulated rent
for a room would simply be the “room rent” plus applicable DHCR
increases. To increase owners’ incentives to comply with the rules,
if a tenant successfully proved that a unit was improperly registered
(or if an owner failed to file a registration), the rent for the unit
should be set at the lowest legal rate in the building or $215, which-
ever is less, and treble damages applied for any overcharge.149
146 For example, between approximately 2000 and 2010, most of the almost 200
rooms at the Greenpoint Hotel in Brooklyn were falsely registered as “temporarily
exempt due to transient occupancy.” The Greenpoint’s owners used these false regis-
trations to deny tenants’ regulatory status and dispute rent overcharge complaints
both before DHCR and in Housing Court proceedings. (DHCR Registration on file
with authors).
147 See generally supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
148 Id.
149 $215 per month is the shelter allowance for a one-person household provided
by New York City Public Assistance. See CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, PUBLIC BENEFITS FOR LOW-
2013]SINGLE-ROOM OCCUPANCY HOUSING IN NEW YORK 143
Finally, in order to inform all of these changes, a large-scale
study similar to the invaluable Blackburn report150 should be com-
missioned. DHPD’s Housing and Vacancy Survey and the RGB’s
occasional memoranda about SRO units are helpful, but lack
depth and scope. The report should not extrapolate from past
studies, as Housing and Vacancy Survey reports have done, nor rely
solely on rent registration data, as a recent RGB study has.151 In the
authors’ experience, it is not uncommon for rent registration data
to be inaccurate.152 In order to gauge the actual state of the SRO
market, a more finely tuned study is required. Furthermore, it
would be helpful to understand the exact scope of the illegal SRO
market and the exact number of rent-regulated SRO units that are
being used for purposes other than affordable housing.
CONCLUSION
Though often misunderstood, SRO housing has played an in-
tegral role in New York City’s housing market. A more robust SRO
housing stock would provide truly affordable housing to thousands
of poor and low-income New Yorkers and could significantly allevi-
ate the City’s homelessness crises. Bringing SROs back to New York
City is possible, but will require significant changes in City and
State policy. A new attitude towards and understanding of SROs is
necessary to ensure that such housing can once again serve its vital
function.
INCOME INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES: APPLYING FOR AND USING PUBLIC BENEFIT PRO-
GRAMS: CASH ASSISTANCE 3 (2013), available at http://benefitsplus.cssny.org/system/
files/benefit-tools/attachments/Cash%20Assistance.pdf.
150 See supra note 1.
151 See generally N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., supra note 75.
152 Indeed, in 2011 Make the Road New York found that 45% of apartments were
registered with inflated rents and that 64% of a sample of 200 apartments had regis-
tration irregularities, including 33% with gaps in rent registration. MAKE THE ROAD
N.Y., RENT FRAUD: ILLEGAL RENT INCREASES AND THE LOSS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN
NEW YORK CITY 5 (2011), available at http://www.maketheroad.org/pix_reports/
DHCR%20Report.pdf.

